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By RAOUL BERGER t
ADMINISTRATIVE remedies must be exhausted before resort is had to
the federal courts. The doctrine is as old as federal administrative law,'
and in the fifty years that have elapsed since the early decisions it has
been expounded in a formidable mass of case law. Yet there remain
doubts which continue to engender litigation as to the application of what
is essentially a simple rule of procedure. It is not as if the exhaustion
doctrine presented profound legal or social problems. The rule merely
involves a policy of orderly procedure which favors a preliminary admin-
istrative sifting process, a policy which is best effectuated by a simple,
unvarying practice. Such a practice might do away with the spectacle
of preliminary litigation to decide whether a court or administrative
tribunal should in the first instance determine, for example, whether
"Ry-Krisp" is a "cooked cereal food" or "bakery goods." 2  It is the
purpose of this article to explore several of the areas within the exhaustion
doctrine in which uncertainty prevails, and to examine the historical
bases of and the policies behind the rule, with the hope of clarifying
the objectives and consequently the application of the rule.
I.
Commonly identified with Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail-way,3 the
exhaustion doctrine in fact antedates that case. It is first met in tax
cases arising in the lower federal courts in which injunctions were
refused because the complainant had neglected to avail himself of the
redress that a board might furnish against an allegedly illegal assess-
ment.4 A definitive formulation of the doctrine by the Supreme Court
I General Counsel's Staff, Securities and F_xchange Commission.
1. Federal administrative law may be said to have taken shape with the advent of
the Interstate Commerce Commission in 18s7. The earliest manifestation of the e.xhmus-
tion doctrine is found in Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. Charlton, 32 Fed. 192
(C. C. D. Ore. 1887) (injunction denied where no appeal was taken from tax assessor to
state board) ; Altschul v. Gittings, 86 Fed. 200 (C. C. D. Ore. 1893).
2. Great Northern Ry. v. Ry-Krisp Co., 4 F. Supp. 358, 365 (D. Minn. 1933) ("the
question presented is one peculiarly for the commission to determine preliminarily before
this court could assume jurisdiction.")
3. 211 U1. S. 210 (1908); see Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and Slate Regulation
of Public Utilities (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 379, 385; Alpert, Suits :lainst .duninistra-
tive Agencies Under N.IR.A. and A.A.A. (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 393, 395;
Comment (1938) 51 HAv. L. REx. 1251, 1261; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit
Co., 279 U. S. 159, 208 (1929).
4. Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. Charlton; Altschul v. Gittings, supra note 1.
There is language in Altschul v. Gittings (p.202) from which it might be inferred that
the court felt bound by the state statute, which imposed upon the taxpayer a duty of
seeing administrative relief, to bar the complainant. No state statute can, of course,
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had also been enunciated in an immigration case, United States v. Sing
Tuck.' That case arose on a petition for habeas corpus, and the Court
denied relief because the petitioner had failed to follow the statutory
provision for appeal from the immigration official to the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor. Mr. Justice Holmes declared that the act "points
out a mode of procedure which must be followed before there can be
a resort to the courts." 6
The Prentis case marks an extension of the exhaustion doctrine
insofar as it requires a litigant to exhaust his right of appeal from a
state commission to a state legislative court as a preliminary to relief
by a federal court. At the same time, however, the decision represents a
refinement of a different and earlier rule, the rule that courts will not
enjoin the process of legislation.7  In the Prentis case legislative rate
making had been initiated by a Commission which promulgated a rate,
for which, so the statute provided, the state Supreme Court might on
appeal substitute its own order. This corrective power was deemed by
the United States Supreme Court legislative in nature, and it therefore
decided that a federal injunction directed to the Commission should be
withheld until the State, acting through its highest court, completed its
legislative action.' The postponement of judicial relief until the state
have the effect of limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts. In a case arising in a
federal court, where the state statute provided "that no such injunction shall be awarded
unless application be first made to the auditor to correct the mistake claimed, and the
auditor shall refuse to do so," the Supreme Court said, "While this provision cannot,
of course, bind the courts of the United States, it is nearly in accord with the rule
governing the exercise of the jurisdiction in equity of those courts . . . " (italics sup-
plied). Pittsburgh Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S. 32, 47 (1898).
5. 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
6. Id. at 167.
7. Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 413 (1894) (refusal to restrain
railroad commission from "proceeding to establish reasonable rates and regulations") ; New
Orleans Water Works v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471 (1896) (refusal to enjoin passage
of ordinance) ; McChord v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 183 U. S. 483 (1902) (refusal
to enjoin fixing of rates by Commission).
8. In Pittsburgh Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S. 32, 45 (1898), the
Supreme Court had taken note of the possibility that a court might, in the exercise of
a power to correct the assessment of a board, be employing administrative rather than
judicial power.
The revisory power, the "power to promulgate another order to take the place of
the one stricken down," which is said to be the distinguishing characteristic of a "legis-
lative" court [Kansas City So. Ry. v. Cornish, 65 F. (2d) 671, 673 (C. C. A. 10th,
1933)] is expressly granted in the constitutions of only two states, Virginia (Art. XII,
§ 156(g) and Oklahoma (Art. IX, § 23). For statutory provisions, see ARiZONA Rrv.
CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 720; CoLoRADo STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 137,
§ 52; LoUIsIANA GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 7937. And see Van Buren Water Co.
v. Van Buren, 152 Ark. 83, 237 S. W. 696, 698 (1922), and Porter v. Investors Syndicate,
286 U. S. 461 (1932), which respectively construe an Arkansas and a Montana statute
to permit the state court to substitute its own order for, or modify, the administrative
order, thus creating "legislative" review.
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takes "final legislative action" rests not alone on the disinclination of
the judiciary to interfere with the exercise of the legislative power,"' but
on the fact that no harm can result until the legislation takes definite
form; or, as the Supreme Court has said in denying an injunction against
the fixing of rates by a Commission, "none of the consequences alleged
to be threatened can be set up as the basis of equity interposition before
the rates are fixed at all."11 This formulation underlies the analogous
cases, frequently cited for the exhaustion doctrine, in which the court
refuses to enjoin an administrative official from performing his statutory
duties on the ground that until he has acted the complainant can show
no more than an apprehension that he will perform his duty wrongly, a
fear that courts will not allay.12  Such cases may be expressed in the
formula that judicial intervention is prenature in the absence of admin-
istrative action. 3 But doctrinal lines of demarcation have apparently been
unnoticed,' 4 and there has been a confluence of the various sources,
from which a broad exhaustion doctrine may be said to have evolved.
Today the various categories of cases are lumped together as authority
for widespread application of the rule.'
The development of the doctrine has largely been shaped by three fac-
tors: the need for orderly procedure, the requirements of comity, and
the tendency to assimilate the doctrine to the rule that a litigant has no
standing in equity where he has an adequate remedy at law.
The necessity for orderly procedure in the administrative process was
first proclaimed by Mr. Justice Holmes in a case wherein judicial relief
9. 211 U. S. 210, at 230 (1908). The criteria for distinguishing between legislative
and judicial functions of a court (see Comment (1934) 1 U. or C1. L. RE%. 777) have
proven to be a far from infallible touchstone; and the unwary litigant who fails properly
to gauge the capacity in which the state court functions is likely to find himself barred by
a plea of res jidicata. Dorrance v. Martin, 12 F. Supp. 746 (D. N. J. 1935).
10. See note 7, supra.
11. McChord v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 183 U. S. 483, 502 (1902).
12. First National Bank v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548, 553 (1903); Dalton Machine
Co. v. Virginia, 236 U. S. 699, 701 (1915) ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, n1 U. S.
300, 304 (1934). And see Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186 (1900).
13. That the distinction behveen these cases and the cases in which a litigant has
ignored an available administrative remedy may on occasion be more titan verbal is
disclosed in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 300, 304 (1934): "The decision
of the state court must be affirmed, not because the appellant has failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies, which would concern us only if the suit had been brought in a
federal court of equity, but because without administrative action, which has not occurred,
there can be no infringement of the immunity invoked."
14. The cases have an air of being conceived in 'acuo; the leading tax cases, Farn-
comb v. Denver, 252 U. S. 7 (1920); and Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel District, 262 U. S.
710 (1923) for example, make no mention of United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161
(1904), or of the Prentis case. Indeed the Pren!is case has itself been deemed a product
of spontaneous generation. See Lilienthal, supra note 3, at 385.
15. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 51, n.9 (1938).
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was withheld because of the failure to appeal to a federal executive
officer. Despite the argument that the administrative officer was without
jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Holmes insisted upon exhaustion of the admin-
istrative remedy, declaring that "it is one of the necessities of the admin-
istration of justice that even fundamental questions should be deter-
mined in an orderly way."'" The requirement of orderly procedure
had been formulated in the habeas corpus cases arising out of state
commitments, 17 and these cases subsequently furnished Mr. Justice
Holmes with an analogy in formulating the Prentis doctrine., Emphasis
upon orderly procedure serves to preserve the advantages of a "prelim-
inary sifting process"'" by a tribunal specially equipped to deal with
problems that are often of great technical complexity."0 It further serves
to preclude efforts "to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first
instance,"'" a factor that becomes increasingly important as the steadily
growing stream of litigation makes it important to divert,2 if only ten-
porarily, those controversies for which administrative remedies have been
provided. And there is always the possibility that the action of the
administrative officer or board may render resort to the courts unnec-
essary, for a board may decide that the issue lies outside of its juris-
diction, or a superior administrative body may on appeal correct the
error complained of.
The place of comity in the history of the exhaustion doctrine is of
more than academic interest, because as a rule of comity the applica-
tion of the doctrine may be thought to lie within the discretion of the
court, whereas if the doctrine is more closely related to the chancery rule
that relief is unavailable in the presence of an adequate remedy, the rule
then becomes one of equity jurisdiction. There has been a tendency to
emphasize the importance of the role played by comity in the develop-
ment of the exhaustion doctrine. It "must be remembered," said the
16. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 168 (1904).
17. Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 181 (1907); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S.
103, 115 (1935).
18. 211 U. S. 210, 229 (1908).
19. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 170 (1904); Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160, 174 (1927).
20. The contribution towards efficiency of preliminary resort to expert administrative
examination has received its greatest recognition in the Inter'state Commerce Commission
cases. See Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U, S. 285, 291 (1022) ;
Board of Railroad Comm's v. Great Northern Ry., 281 U. S. 412, 424 (1930) ; 2 SUAnR-
MAN, THE INTERSTATE COIMERCE CO ,-ISSION (1931) 405; Armstrong v. United States,
16 F. (2d) 387, 389 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
21. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 170 (1904) ; United States Navigation
Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 50 F. (2d) 83, 91 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
22. For discussion of the problems raised by increased federal litigation see Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicial Power Betwecn United Stales and State Courts (1928)
13 CoRN. L. Q. 499, passhi.
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Supreme Court in Railroad Comnmyission v. Duluth Street Raiway'
"that the requirement that state remedies be exhausted is not a funda-
mental principle of substantive law but merely a requirement of con-
venience or comity." So far as the facts of the Duluth case, which
involved the question of exhausting an appeal from a commission to
a state court, are concerned, the statement of the Court has a sound
historical basis. For the extension of the exhaustion requirement to the
situation where appeal lies from a board to a court acting legislatively
was to a large extent rested in the Prcntis case on "considerations of
comity and convenience."' 24 While the extension of the doctrine to the
peculiar situation presented in the Prentis case may therefore be rested
upon considerations of comity, and while the application of the rule
undeniably has "special force when resort is had to the federal courts
to restrain the actions of state officers,"'2 it is suggested that the earlier
applications of the rule to state administrative bodies were based not so
much upon considerations of comity2 as upon the theory that resort to
equity is premature in the absence of administrative action, -  or so long
as some other remedy is available.
The tendency to assimilate the presence of an administrative remedy
to the availability of an adequate remedy at law, clearly articulated in the
later cases,28 made itself felt from the outset.20  From the beginning,
23. 273 U. S. 625, 628 (192).
24. 211 U. S. 210, 229 (1908).
25. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 311 (1938); Lawrence v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 274 U. S. 588, 595 (1927).
26. The direct progenitors of the Prentis case, cases in which the courts refused to
enjoin the process of legislation by state agencies, make no mention of comity. See
note 7, supra.27. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186 (1900) ; San Diego Land and Town Co.
v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 441 (1903) ; First National Bank v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548,
553 (1908).
28. It was held with reference to the National Labor Relations Act that the admin-
istrative procedure and review provided by the act furnishes "a plain, adequate and
complete remedy at law.' Elliott v. El Paso Electric Co., 88 F. (2d) 505. 506 (C. C. A.
5th, 1937) ; Pratt v. Oberman & Co., 89 F. (2d) 786, 787 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; Precision
Castings Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 15, 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). And see Royal Baking
Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 32 F. (2d) 966, 968 (App. D. C. 1929) ; De Pauv
University v. Brunk, 53 F. (2d) 647, 652 (IV. D. 11o. 1931); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v.
Board of Public -Works, 17 F. Supp. 170, 173 (N. D. WV. Va. 1936); 'McDermott v.
Bradford, 10 F. Supp. 661, 664 (V. D. Wash. 1935).
It is worth noting that the language of "exhaustion" creeps into the cases where a
simple contract creditor is said to have "no right whatsoever in equity until he has
exhausted his legal remedy." Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 497 (1923) ;
Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 20 (1922). See also 'Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521
(1932).
29. See note 30, infra: And see quotation from Pittsburgh Ry. v. Board of Public
Works, 172 U. S. 32 (1898) at note 4, supra. The case is cited by Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 51, n. 9 (1938).
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the exhaustion rule was formulated in terms of equity jurisdiction, that
is to say, a litigant who failed to avail himself of administrative avenues
of redress could not "maintain a suit in equity.""0 And the cases have
again and again pointed out that there is no jurisdiction in equity in the
absence of exhaustion of the administrative remedy. Thus, where a
plaintiff "failed to avail itself of the administrative remedy" it "was not
entitled to maintain a bill in equity"; 1 or as another court put it, "if
there is an adequate administrative remedy . . . that is sufficient to
defeat federal equity jurisdiction." 2 Yet despite the frequency with
which it has been indicated that the absence of prior administrative resort
compels the dismissal of a suit in equity, it is still not entirely clear
whether application of the rule rests within the discretion of the court or
is non-discretionary. At the last term of the Supreme Court, it was inti-
mated by way of dictum in Natural Gas Pipeline Company v. Slattery that
the issuance of an injunction in the presence of an available administrative
remedy lies within the discretion of the trial court,33 whereas Mr. Justice
Brandeis at the same term of court declared that the entry of an in-
junction under such circumstances constitutes an "improvident exercise
of judicial discretion," and that the exhaustion doctrine is "not merely
a rule governing the exercise of discretion," but "is one of judicial admin-
istration."34 It is suggested that the latter view may find a broad base
30. Dundee Mtge. Trust Inv. Co. v. Charlton, 32 Fed. 192, 195 (C. C. D. Ore. 1887) ;
Altschul v. Gittings, 86 Fed. 200, 202 (C. C. D. Ore. 1898) ; Brown v. Drain, 112 Fed.
582, 591 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1901).
31. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 265, 270 (1924).
32. De Pauw University v. Brunk, 53 F. (2d) 647, 652 (W. D. Mo. 1931), cfld,
285 U. S. 527 (1932) (per curiam: "The Court being of opinion that there is no juris-
diction in equity, the order of the District Court dismissing the bill of complaint in this
cause is affirmed.") And see Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274
U. S. 160, 174 (1927) ("That right being adequate, they were not in a position to ask
relief by injunction. The bill should have been dismissed for want of equity") ; Western
Powder Mfg. Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E. D. I1. 1934) ("the
court has no jurisdiction of such controversies until the administrative remdie- have
been exhausted.") See also United States v. Illinois Central Ry., 291 U. S. 457, 463
(1934) ; Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U. S. 106, 109 (1934) ; Western & Atlantic R. R.
v. Georgia Public Serv. Comm., 267 U. S. 493, 497 (1925); Kansas City So. Ry. v.
Cornish, 65 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; Schermerhorn v. Holloman, 74 F. (2d)
265, 266 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) ; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 17 F.
Supp. 170, 173 (N. D. W. Va. 1936) ; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.,
32 F. (2d) 966 (App. D. C. 1929); Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Stipp. 139,
142 (N. D. Ga. 1934); McDermott v. Bradford, 10 F. Supp. 661, 664 (W. D. Wash.
1935) ; Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S. D. Ill. 1933).
33. 302 U. S. 300, 311 (1938) ; United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274,
282 (1925).
34. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 51, n. 9 (1938). The
doubt engendered by the Slattery and Myers decisions is noted in Red River Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 98 F. (2d) 282, 284 (App. D. C. 1938)
where the Myers case is cited among others for the proposition: "Generally, the rule is
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in the cases which declare that the availability of an administrative remedy
is an element of equity jurisdiction.35 Equitable relief is extraordinary
relief, invoked because of the absence of an adequate remedy at law,
and an objection to the jurisdiction in equity on the ground that the legal
remedy is adequate demands dismissal of the suitY06 By analogy3 "no
cause of action in equity is stated" where the administrative remedy is
not exhausted.3" This is not to say that administrative exhaustion is
completely assimilated to an adequate remedy at law, for, while the
inquiry into the adequacy and efficiency of the legal remedy is always
pertinent, there is far less need to emphasize the adequacy of the admin-
istrative remedy. Insistence upon prior administrative resort is at most
preliminary to judicial action, and the litigant who is sent back to an
administrative tribunal can return for equitable relief. Not so the litigant
who is remitted to his remedy at law, for the legal remedy may constitute
final judicial action, and the litigant may upon his return to equity be
faced by a plea of res judicata, even in those situations in which equity
will assist the litigant to obtain the fruits of his judgment at lav. For
a court of chancery will not, except for fatal jurisdictional flaws, go
behind the judgment, whereas a reviewing court is free to examine the
administrative record. Limitations upon the scope of judicial review of
administrative findings of fact at times lend such findings an aspect of
finality, but the court is at least free to determine whether the findings
are supported by the evidence, and it is entirely free to substitute its own
findings of law.
M'[oreover, statement of the exhaustion doctrine in terms of an adequate
remedy at law39 is misleading because emphasis is placed not so much
on the comparative inadequacy as on the almost complete absence of the
administrative remedy. Thus, in one case,"0 no exhaustion was required
stated as being conclusive of the rights of one who prematurely seeks judicial review,
without intimation or suggestion that any judicial discretion is involved in its applica-
tion," but attention is also called by the court to the cases cited supra izwte 33. See also
Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 207, 203 (1929).
35. See note 32, szpra.
36. Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 [RE.. STAT. § 723 (1875) 28 U. S. C.
§384 (1934)] provides that "Suits in equity shall not be sustained in any court of the
United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had
at law." This section is merely declaratory of the equity rule. Matthews v. Rodgers,
284 U. S. 521, 524 (1932).
37. See United States v. Illinois Central Ry., 291 U. S. 457, 463 (1934); Bradley
v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 485 (1913).
38. Shapiro v. Lyle, 30 F. (2d) 971, 973 (Xv D. Wash. 1929); see note 32, spra.
39. Nelson v. First National Bank, 42 F. (2d) 30, 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) ; De Pau.v
University v. Brunk, 53 F. (2d) 647 (NV. D. Mo. 1931). Note that the employment of
the terminology of "adequate remedy" further assimilates the jurisdictional aspect of
the availability of the administrative remedy to the presence of an adequate remedy at law.
40. Brotherhood Co-op. Nat. Bank v. Hurlburt, 21 F. (2d) 85, SS (D. Ore. 19-7).
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because it was beyond the power of the administrative authorities to grant
relief in the absence of authority to equalize taxation by assessing notes
and bonds exempt by law. In another case," ' where the grievance was that
other taxpayers were illegally taxed too low, the administrative remedy
was held inadequate because of the shortness of time available for investi-
gation, and the difficulty of ascertaining the names of those who were
thus assessed on a different basis so that in effect the plaintiff was barred
from the administrative remedy. Unreasonable delay by the administra-
tive body in deciding has also moved courts to dispense with the ex-
haustion requirement.4" In the main, therefore, the grounds for declaring
an administrative remedy inadequate have been far less comprehensive
than those that may be advanced in the case of a remedy at law.43 But
even this relatively limited inquiry into the adequacy of the administrative
remedy has in one federal circuit engendered doubts and litigation which
considerably diminish the effectiveness Of what should be a simple rule
of administration.44
The questions of whether an application for an administrative rehear-
ing is a necessary element of exhaustion, and whether exhaustion is
required where it is anticipated that administrative action will be un-
favorable have likewise given rise to uncertainty. In an early case,
Vandalia Railroad Company v. Public Service Comm ission, 4 5 which in-
volved an Indiana statute declaring that "the Commission shall have
authority" to grant a rehearing, 40 the Supreme Court held that a failure
to apply for an administrative rehearing precluded resort to the courts.
A few years later, in Prendergast z,. New York Telephone Company 47
41. Munn v. Des Moines National Bank, 18 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 8th; 1927);
also see Nelson v. First National Bank, 42 F. (2d) 30, 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
42. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587, 591 (1926) ; Belt Line Ry. v.
Newton, 273 Fed. 272 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). But see American Mutual Liability Insurance
Co. v. McDonough, 61 F. (2d) 558, 560 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
43. For problems in connection with adequate remedy at law see 21 C. J. 50, ct seq.
44. Munn v. Des Moines Natl. Bank, 18 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Nelson
v. First Natl. Bank, 42 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) ; Knowles v. First Natl. Bank,
58 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Crawford County Trust & Savings Bank v.
Crawford County, 66 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) ; Hamerstrom v. Toy National
Bank, 81 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). These cases were concerned with the adequacy
of the Iowa administrative remedy to relieve against discriminatory state taxation of a
bank. A situation which leads litigants to appeal five times in nine years to the same
Court of Appeals to determine whether exhaustion is necessary under these circumstances
would seem to indicate the desirability of a practice less likely to generate uncertainty
and breed litigation;
45. 242 U. S. 255, 260 (1916).
46. IND. REv. STAT. (Burns, 1908) § 5537; Acts of 1907, subd. (c), p. 454, § 7.
47. 262 U. S. 43, 48 (1923), distinguishing Palermo Land and Water Co. v. R. R.
Commission, 227 Fed. 708 (N. D. Cal. 1915) on the ground that the statute there in-
volved provided that no action should accrue in the absence of a petition for an admin-
istrative rehearing. See also Chicago Ry. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 277 Fed. 970, 974
(N. D. Ill. 1922).
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the Supreme Court, making no mention of the I'andalia case, declared that
exhaustion was unnecessary where the statute did not require an appli-
cation for a rehearing. As a result, courts have demanded an application
for an administrative rehearing as a preliminary to judicial relief only
where the statute required such an application.4' A departure from these
cases was recently indicated in Red Rier Broadcasting Company v. Fed-
eral Conzmunications Commission, where it was held that an omission
to apply for a rehearing under a permissive statute constituted a failure
to exhaust the administrative remedy.49 Insistence upon an application
to the administrative body for a rehearing as an element of exhaustion
can be urged upon several grounds. It is consonant with the recent policy
of Congress, as exemplified in several instances by a statutory bar to
judicial review in the absence of an application for an administrative
rehearing. The Federal Power Act, for example, declares that "No
proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be brought by
any person unless such person shall have made application to the com-
mission for a rehearing thereon.""" With reference to one such provision,
it was said in another recent case that the purpose of Congress in em-
ploying such language "was apparently to secure to the Commission an
opportunity to correct its errors when attention is properly called there-
to."" The possibility of erring is of course not confined to the admin-
istrative bodies for whom such opportunities to correct their errors are
expressly provided. And insofar as an administrative body can be pre-
vailed upon to correct its errors resort to the courts becomes unnecessary.
It is this consideration which has influenced the courts in a parallel line
of cases to require prior resort to an administrative body for modifica-
tion of its rules and regulations as a preliminary to judicial relief. 2
Presumably administrative rules and regulations are promulgated after
48. Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U. S. 413, 416 (1925) ; Culumbia Gas & Elec. CO. v.
Blease, 42 F. (2d) 463, 465 (D. S. C. 1927): Pender County v. Garysburg Mfg. Co.,
50 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) ; cf. United States F. & G. Co. Y. Blankenhorn, 22 F.
(2d) 574, 576 (N. D. Cal. 1927).
49. 98 F. (2d) 282, 287 (App. D. C. 1938), cert. denied, 59 Sup. Ct. 85 (U. S. 1938).
The pertinent statute provided that after any decision by the Commission any party "mayv
at any time make application for rehearing of the same . . . and it shall he lawful for
the Commission in its discretion to grant such a rehearing . . ."
50. Section 313a (16 U. S. C. A. § 825, 1(a) Supp. 1938).
51. fallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 99 F. (2d) 399
(App. D. C. 1938). The Brru!,mous COAL Acr (1937) (15 U. S. C. A. §836(b) Supp.
1938), provides that "No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered
by the court unless such objection shall have been urged below." This provision .%as held
in the Mallory case to require an application for an administrative rehearing. For parallel
provisions see SEcuRTs Acr OF 1933, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77i(a) (Supp. 1937) ;
SEcuRiTrEs EXCH E AcT OF 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78y(a); PUDLic UTILiTy Hoz.mNG
Com.Axy Acr OF 1935, 15 U. S. C. § 79x(a) (Supp. 1937).
52. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U. S. 570 (1934); Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v.
Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380 (1912).
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due deliberation. Yet an appeal to the administrative body for modifica-
tion of a rule is required because, as the Supreme Court recently remarked,
"there is the possibility of removal of these issues from the case by
modification of its order." 3 The same possibility that administrative
self-modification may remove the occasion for resort to the courts should
influence the courts to insist upon an application for an administrative
rehearing as a prerequisite to judicial relief. 4 A clear-cut requirement
that application for an administrative rehearing must be made in each
instance would remove the doubts that have frequently encouraged liti-
gation on this score in the pastY To leave the application of the require-
ment in the realm of discretion is to depart from the rationale of the
exhaustion rule. And a practice which requires a prior judicial determin-
ation in each instance as to whether an administrative rehearing is neces-
sary lifts to undeserved importance a step in the administrative procedure
which in most instances can be satisfied without imposing undue burdens
upon either litigant or administrative body."
A somewhat wavering course has been charted in the treatment of
cases in which it is alleged that the administrative body has expressed
an unfavorable attitude towards the litigant. In Gilchrist v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Company, the plaintiff applied to a New York Commission
for a higher rate, and thereafter filed a bill alleging that the 5 cent fare
was confiscatory. On the day that this suit was instituted the Transit
Commission denied the petition for want of jurisdiction. Although it
appeared that the Commission "had long held the view that it lacks power
to change the five cent rate established by contract," the United States
Supreme Court declared "the Interborough could not have resorted to
a federal court without first applying to the Commission as prescribed
by statute. And having made such an application it could not defeat
orderly action by alleging an intent [on the part of the Commission]
53. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 311 (1937).
54. It may be urged that the requirement of a rehearing with respect to the exercise
of a quasi-legislative function in an initial informal hearing is more justifiable than in
the case of an original quasi-judicial hearing where the issues may have been more
thoroughly canvassed. An unvarying quantum of deliberation is not an unfailing attribute
of either type of hearing. Attention is called to the trend towards a thorough sifting
of the facts as a preliminary to administrative rule-making. See Fuchs, Procedure in
Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 HARv. L. RIv. 259, 268.
55. But see Southland Industries v. Federal Communications Commission, 99 F. (2d)
117, 121 (App. D. C. 1938): "This is not and should not be an arbitrary requirement.
Whether a petition for rehearing should be filed in a particular case must be decided
on the merits as each case arises." Note that the Communications Act involved in this
case declares that a party nay apply for a rehearing. The language of the statutes cited
supra note 51 appears to preclude any exercise of discretion.
56. See DoiE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 748, for the practice of taking exceptions
before the federal master to his tentative report, thus affording him an opportunity to
correct his errors.
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to deny the relief sought.1' 57 In short, despite clear evidence that the
Commission felt itself powerless to decide in favor of Interborough, the
Court emphasized the need for prior resort to the Commission in the
interest of orderly formal action. Subsequently, however, in City Bank
Company v. Schnader, the Supreme Court adopted a seemingly anti-
thetical position without mentioning the Gilchrist case, saying:
"In view of what has been said, the appellant's cause of action in
equity will not, strictly speaking, arise until an appraisement is made
and certified to the Department of Revenue and notice of the fact
is given appellant. However, in view of the allegations of the bill,
we are not inclined to hold the suit premature. The bill charges
that the Secretary of Revenue has refused to issue a waiver of tax,
and that the Attorney General has notified the appellant and the
State's appraiser the property is subject to the tax, and the appel-
lant's claim for exemption will be denied .... The action the
legality of which is challenged thus appears sufficiently imminent
and certain to justify the intervention of a court of equity."' 3
It is difficult to reconcile this pronouncement with the Gilchrist case. To
be sure the Sclnader case rests upon the threat of illegal action by officers
of the state, but irreparable injury may proceed as well from an official
refusal to relieve against continuing illegal confiscation.
One may be permitted to question the wisdom of basing judicial
action upon informal administrative pronouncements, clues to which
are derived from expressions of opinion and other unofficial sources.
There is need to re-examine the basis of these cases in the light of the
tendency to insist in the rehearing cases upon an application to the ad-
ministrative body for a rehearing as a prerequisite to judicial relief. If
it be deemed sound policy to give the administrative body an opportunity
to reconsider and perhaps to modify its decision formally announced
after presumably mature deliberation, how much more important is it
that a board should not, merely because it has ventured an informal
opinion, be deprived of the chance to hear argument, take the matter
under advisement, and record its judgment in proper form. The likeli-
hood that an administrative body may, after a formal hearing, modify
a prior informal adverse opinion is at least as great as the possibility
of inducing that tribunal to withdraw its considered judgment in the
course of a rehearing.
59
57. 279 U. S. 159, 208, 211 (1929).
58. 291 U. S. 24, 34 (1934). Exhaustion has been dispensed with where declarations
of intentions adverse to the claims of complainants were made at the end of negotiations
or during the course of an administrative hearing. See Procter & Gamble Distributing
Co. v. Sherman, 2 F. (2d) 165, 167 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); Interstate Natural Gas Co.
v. Gully, 8 F. Supp. 174 (S. D. Aliss. 1934).
59. One court taxed costs against a plaintiff who failed to exhaust the administrative
remedy on the ground that the administrative body had expressed an adverse opinion,
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II.
Litigants have often successfully sought to escape the sweep of the
exhaustion doctrine on the ground that the administrative agency was
acting without jurisdiction, either because the particular case was allegedly
outside the subject matter, or because the attempt to confer authority
on the administrative body was claimed to be unconstitutional. The
frequent judicial rejection of the exhaustion rule under such circuni-
stances sprang from the influence of the theory of ultra vires. It was an
outgrowth of the conception that an administrative body exercises limited
authority and is to be strictly confined within the bounds of that authority.
Proceeding from this premise, a court felt free to ascertain for itself
whether the litigant came within the scope of that authority; and a
litigant outside the jurisdiction conferred was deemed free to ignore the
administrative procedure and with it the requirement of exhaustion."
Thus a Porto Rican was not required to exhaust the administrative remedy
where an administrative agency was empowered to exclude aliensY'
Similarly, where the jurisdiction of the board was confined to transac-
tions in interstate commerce, the courts found that a litigant who was
engaged solely in intrastate commerce, or in local manufacturing, was
outside the jurisdiction of the board and therefore not bound to exhaust
the administrative procedure.62
The need, in the interest of orderly procedure, for abandoning the
"authority" premise as a test for the application of the exhaustion require-
ment, was perceived by Mr. Justice Holmes as long ago as 1904. In
United States v. Sing Tuck, 3 a habeas corpus proceeding which involved
the power to exclude an alien, petitioner objected that the act was not
intended to apply to one who was a citizen. But, replied Mr. Justice
Holmes, the act
"points out a mode of procedure which must be followed before there
can be a resort to the courts. In order to act at all the executive
officer must decide upon the question of citizenship. If his juris-
diction is subject to being upset, still it is necessary that he should
proceed if he decides that it exists. An appeal is provided by the
statute. The first mode of attacking his decision is by taking that
apjpeal...
"for the reason that, had it proceeded in an orderly and reasonably thorough manner, the
occasion for the present suit would probably never have arisen." Air-way Electric
Appliance Co. v. Archer, 279 Fed. 878, 891 (S. D. Ohio 1922).
60. DIcKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY oF LtAW (1927) 309;
Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U. S. 535, 550 (1887).
61. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 15 (1904).
62. Darger v. Hill, 76 F. (2d) 198, 200 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), Royal Farms Dairy v.
Wallace, S F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934); Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp.
407, 409 (N. D. Okla. 1936).
63. 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
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"We perfectly appreciate, while we neither countenance nor dis-
countenance, the argument, drawn from the alleged want of juris-
diction. But while the consequence of that argument if sound is that
both executive officers and the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
are acting without authority, it is one of the necessities of the ad-
ministration of justice that even fundamental questions should be
determined in an orderly way." 64
It is a singular example of the compartmentalized development of the
exhaustion doctrine that subsequent cases involving similar objections to
administrative jurisdiction of the particular controversy should make no
mention of the Sing Tuck case. 6 Although the case is not mentioned in
Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Company, the doctrine of
the Sing Tuck case is there restated; and if defections from the doctrine
resulted in a number of injunctions against the National Labor Relations
Board, 6 it was none the less adhered to by most of the Circuit Couits
of Appeal, and recently reaffirmed in .lllers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Company." It is therefore settled that where an administrative body is
given jurisdiction of a certain subject matter, for example, "unfair prac-
tices affecting interstate commerce," the question of whether the in-
dividual litigant falls within that subject-matter is in the first instance
for the board; hence the-litigant must exhaust the administrative remedy
before turning to the courts.
Although the exhaustion doctrine is a product of chancery, the rule
has gradually been extended to suits at law, and that tendency is recog-
nized and articulated in the Myers case."8 Mr. Justice Brandeis declared
that "because the rule is one of judicial administration-not merely a
rule governing the exercise of discretion-it is applicable to proceedings
at law as well as suits in equity."0 9
The Myers case also reminded the bar of another salutary rule which
likewise has the effect of curtailing judicial interference with the prelim-
inary administrative procedure of federal agencies, but which derives
from a quite different source, the Congress. Congress may delimit the
jurisdiction of federal courts, and it may, if it chooses, confide prelim-
inary processes to administrative bodies, with appropriate judicial review
64. Id. at 167.
65. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 51 (1938);
Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927).
66. See Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp. 407 (N. D. Olda. 193G);
Bendix Products v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 58 (N. D. Ill. 1936) ; cases collected in Comment
(1936) 22 VAsH. U. L. Q. 81, 90, n.33.
67. The cases are collected at 303 U. S. 44, n. 1 (1938).
68. -Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 51, n. 9 (1938).
69. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Da-vis, 301 U. S. 337, 343 (1937) ; First National Bank v.
Weld County, 264 U. S. 450, 455 (1924); Hamerstrom v. Toy National Bank, 81 F.
(2d) 628, 636 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
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to satisfy the demands of due process.7° In contrast to ,the exhaustion
doctrine, which is a product of judicial self-limitation and amounts to
a refusal to exercise jurisdiction upon grounds resembling the require-
ments of equity jurisdiction, the rule of exclusive preliminary administra-
tive jurisdiction presupposes a complete absence of judicial power to deal
with the matter because of the legislative grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to an administrative body. Paradoxically, the rule had its genesis, not
in an attempted legislative grant of exclusive primary jurisdiction, but
in the self-denying attitude of the Supreme Court. For the Act involved
in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company7' purported
to safeguard the common law remedies of shippers ;72 yet a shipper who
had sued at common law to recover damages because of the exaction of
unreasonable rates, admittedly a good common law action, was turned
back to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court reasoned that
the Commission was alQne vested with power originally to entertain such
proceedings, on the ground that the Act sought to secure uniform rates,
and uniformity could be secured only if the Commission passed upon
the reasonableness of the rates in the first instance.7"
An attempt to escape from the necessity of preliminary resort despite
the statutory grant of primary exclusive jurisdiction, on the ground that
the litigant was without the ambit of that jurisdiction, was turned back
in the pioneer case of Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comnins-
SiOll.74
"The real gist of the complaint here is that it is claimed, and with
plausibility, that the chief petitioner is not subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission . . . The law does not contemplate
that commissions of this nature will act arbitrarily nor without prob-
able cause. It is, of course, conceivable that they may do so; but
such a possibility cannot justify this court in exceeding its statutory
powers and authority. To do so would be to deny to the administra-
tive and legislative branches of the government the powers and
authority which have been conferred upon them . . . It may be
desirable that the law should provide for a preliminary review of
questions of jurisdiction either by the Circuit Courts of Appeals or
by the District Courts; but, in the absence of such provision, we
cannot assume that power."
70. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U. S. 41, 48 (1938) ; Anniston Mfg.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 343-346 (1937).
71. 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
72. Id. at 438-439. And see 2 SHARFMIAN, THE INTERSTATE COMsMERa- COMMHSION
(1931) 393.
73. Alpert, supra note 3 at 393, 395, sees in the Abilene case the progenitor of the
exhaustion doctrine. It has been observed that the rule of exhaustion reaches back at
least to 1887. And of course exclusive administrative jurisdiction is far older. See Cary
v. Curtis, 3 How. 236 (U. S. 1845) (see the issue as formulated at p. 253).
74. 280 Fed. 45, 48 (C. C. A. Sth, 1922).
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With the teaching of the Federal Trade Commission cases in mind."
Congress in express terms vested "exclhsive" power to prevent "unfair
practices affecting interstate commerce" in the National Labor Relations
Board, subject to review by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. The effect
of that exclusive grant of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared in
Jlyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, was to deprive the District
Courts of jurisdiction to enjoin hearings before the Board, and to vest
the Board with power to determine in the first instance whether the par-
ticular controversy fell within the jurisdiction granted." To the argument
that this was tantamount to a denial of constitutional rights, the Court
replied that "the contention is at w;ar with the long settled rule of judicial
administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted. ' 77  The fact that the exhaustion cases were thus cited to
buttress the primary jurisdiction doctrine underscores the essential iden-
tity, for practical purposes, of both rules. It cannot matter that the rules
employ a somewhat different dialectic when the net effect of either rule
is that a court of equity will refuse to take jurisdiction, in the one case
because it is by federal statute conferred upon an administrative body,
and in the other because the presence of an administrative remedy defeats
equity jurisdiction. With the extension of the exhaustion doctrine to
'courts of law, and the establishment of the non-discretionary nature of
the rule, the sole real point of difference disappears.
Although the Myers decision reaffirms the power of an administrative
body to determine in the first instance whether a case falls within the
statutory grant of jurisdiction over a particular subject matter, that case
sheds no light upon the situation in which the administrative jurisdiction
in toto is challenged on constitutional grounds. Before the constitution-
ality of the National Labor Relations Act was settled a number of the
lower federal courts dispensed with the exhaustion requirement and
passed on the constitutional question.78 Raising the ghost of ultra
75. House Committee Report, . R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935 24.
"Until such final [administrative] order is made the party is not injured, and can,,t he
heard to complain, as has been held in cases under the Federal Trade Cummssioln Act."
76. 303 U. S. 41, 48 (1938).
77. Id. at 50.
78. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. eyers, 15 F. Supp. 915, 918 (D. 'Mass. 193fi
"It is no answer that the act provides for judicial review. The remedies of the act fall
with the other provisions of the act, if it be held unconstitutional in tIo." St.,ut v.
Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864, 870 (W. D. Mo. 1935) ; El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliit. 15 F.
Supp. 81, 90 (NV. D. Te-x. 1936); Oberman and Co. Y. Pratt, 16 F. Supp. 7.
(W. D. 'Mo. 1936); Bendix Products Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 53, (X. I. 11.
1936). See also Hirsh v. Block, 267 Fed. 614, 618 (App. D. C. 1920) ; Comment (19381
47 YALE L. J. 766, 776 ("But some of the earlier lower court decisions granted injunc-
tions on the ground that the act was unconstitutional, while the ccntentikn in the Iyers
case was that the Board lacked jurisdiction. An argument may perhaps still be made
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vires, distinguished counsel in one case argued that "the act is uncon-
stitutional in its entirety; that the board accordingly has not any authority
whatsoever; and that therefore complainant need not avail itself of the
remedies provided by an invalid statute before seeking relief in the courts
• . . ,,79 But an allegation of unconstitutionality without more has been
held insufficient to invoke equitable aid or relieve from the exhaustion
requirement;"0 and the possibility of raising the constitutional question
in enforcement proceedings brought by the administrative body affords
an adequate legal remedy."' This is not to say that the exhaustion doctrine
is limited to instances in which the constitutional question may be raised
in such enforcement proceedings, for The Supreme Court has on several
occasions applied the broader "rule of judicial administration that no one
is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted" '' to situations
where the jurisdiction of the administrative body was assailed on consti-
tutional grounds in other than enforcement proceedings.
Thus, in Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, the
railroad, ignoring a state statute which required administrative permission
for a change of division points, instituted such a change and sought to
enjoin interference by the state commission on the ground that the at-
tempted state regulation was in violation of the commerce clause, and that
the Commission was in consequence without jurisdiction. Reversing the
injunction granted by the trial court, the Supreme Court declared:
"No right or interest of the Railway would have been prejudiced
by participating in the hearings before the Commission and awaiting
the result thereof. The Railway would not thereby have waived its
right to contest in the federal court the validity of the Oklahoma
law." 83
In a similar situation, where it was alleged that a state statute, requiring
permission by the state commission for the discontinuance of intrastate
service by interstate trains, violated the commerce clause, the Supreme
Court found "no occasion . . . to determine whether the Alabama statute
therefore that the Myers case does not preclude an injunction where the constitutionality
of the whole act is in issue.")
79. Associated Press v. Herrick, 13 F. Supp. 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). But the
argument proved unavailing.
80. Id. at 898 and cases there cited. See also Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521,
525 (1932) ; Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 12, 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 18 F. Supp. 645, 647 (W. D. Wash. 1937).
81. Dalton Machine Co. v. Virginia, 236 U. S. 699, 701 (1915) ; Thomas v. Dennis,
8 F. Supp. 501, 502 (W. D. Wash. 1934); McDermott v. Bradford, 10 F. Supp. 661,
664 (W. D. Wash. 1935); Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co,, 274 U. S.
160, 174 (1927).
82. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
83. 274 U. S. 588, 592 (1927).
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. . . is obnoxious to the Federal Constitution" . . . "the carrier should
not have discontinued the intrastate service without first applying to the
Commission for permission." 4  There are several other cases in the
Supreme Court,s" and a number of decisions in the lower federal courts,
including several cases wherein the issue was presented to the Second
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal in connection with the National
Labor Relations Act," -which make manifest that an attack upon the
jurisdiction of an administrative body on constitutional grounds should
not cause a court of equity to dispense with the exhaustion requirement.
Some confusion, however, beclouds the applicability of the exhaustion
doctrine to tax cases arising under similar circumstances. It would seem
as if the question had been settled when the Supreme Court, in Gorhana
Manufacturing Cornpany z. State Ta.r CorninissionT demanded exhaus-
tion of the administrative remedy despite the challenge to the state tax
law upon constitutional grounds. But the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, in Buder z,. First National Bank, has distinguished
the Gorlam case on the ground that the complaint in the latter was "of
invalid assessments under existing laws. Here the complaint is of an
assessment under no law at all.""8 If there "was no law" continued the
Court, "there was no jurisdiction to assess the shares of stock," and resort
to the board was therefore deemed superfluous. This argument amounts
to no more than a revival of the ultra vires test and represents a regrettable
retrogression. The distinction taken in the Buder case seems, moreover,
to be untenable, because the Gorham case clearly involves an attack upon
the validity of the law under which the tax was assessed. 9 If, in the
84. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Y. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., 279 U. S. 560, 563
(1929).
85. See also Vandalia R. R. v. Public Serv. Comm., 242 U. S. 255, 261 (1916);
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 265 (1924).
86. Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., 88 F. (2d) 59, 60 (C. C. .4 7th, 1937);
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 12, 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Paramino
Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 18 F. Supp. 645, 647, 648 (IV. D. Wash. 1937); Associated
Press v. Herrick, 13 F. Supp. 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Thomas Y. Dennis, 8 F. Supp.
501, 502 (ANW. D. Wash. 1934); McDermott v. Bradford, 10 F. Supp. 651, 663, 654
(WN. D. Wash. 1935) ; United States F. & G. Co. v. Blankenhorn, 22 F. (2d) 574 (N. D.
Cal. 1927). And see Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Fremont, 255 U. S. 124, 128 (1921),
where prior administrative resort was required despite the complaint that the state tax
imposed a burden upon interstate commerce.
87. 266 U. S. 265 (1924).
88. 16 F. (2d) 990, 993 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) cert. denied, 274 U. S. 743 (1927)
(suit in equity), cited with approval in Southern Blvd. R. R. v. City of .Nev, York, 86 F.
(2d) 633, 635 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (suit at law).
89. The gist of the constitutional objection to the Gorham tax was that "the slatutory
ratio . . . has resulted in an assessment against it of a tax based upon an allocated
income greatly in excess of that in fact derived from the business of selling ware which
it carried on within the state", that "such a tax upon income earned without the state
by a foreign corporation engaged principally in interstate commerce, is a direct burden
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language of the Buder case, there was an "existing law" in the Gorham
case, it was because the Supreme Court refused to inquire into the validity
of the law in the absence of exhaustion of the administrative remedy; and
by the same token, there "was no law at all" in the Buder case only be-
cause the court, disregarding the exhaustion requirement, plunged into
the constitutional question.
Among the other arguments advanced to except attacks upon the
constitutionality of administrative jurisdiction from the exhaustion doc-
trine is the contention that since an administrative body is unlikely to
invalidate the questioned enactment, preliminary administrative resort is
not only futile, but may also create an estoppel. A District Court has
held that one who would invoke administrative aid would estop himself
from questioning the constitutionality of the act which conferred the
jurisdiction, and on this ground dispensed with the exhaustion require-
mentY0 But estoppel can scarcely be said to arise out of a situation in
which resort to an administrative tribunal is had under the compulsion
of the exhaustion doctrine." The Supreme Court has said that a litigant
who should have exhausted the administrative remedy "would not thereby
have waived its right to contest in the federal court the validity of the
Oklahoma law." 2
If it be conceded that an administrative tribunal is unlikely to invalidate
the enactment under attack the constitutional question can nonetheless
be saved for judicial review. In addition to the rules of equity which
preclude relief where no more than an assertion of unconstitutionality
appears, or where the constitutional question may be subsequently raised, 3
upon such commerce" (p. 269), and consequently, "that the provisions of this Article
were in conflict with . . . the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." (p. 266). After
summarizing the constitutional issues the Supreme Court said: "We are of the opilion,
however, that, without reference to these constitutional questions, the bill was properly
dismissed by the District Court because of the failure of the company to avail itself
of the administrative remedy provided for the revision and correction of the tax."
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 265, 269 (1924). Becaue of the
short statutes of limitation which accompany the administrative remedy in tax
cases, a litigant's failure to exhaust the remedy may mean that he is left entirely
without remedy. See Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Ef,'ct of Failure to Resort
to Administrative Remedies (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 637. Nevertheless, the need in the
interest of the public treasury for prompt action by tax payers who wNould avoid payment
of taxes has induced the courts to apply the exhaustion doctrine more rigorouqly in tax
cases than elsewhere, so that the principle has been termed by Stason, supra, at 661,
"administrative impregnability by estoppel". But this practice renders the Ruder case
even less explicable.
90. Hirsh v. Block, 267 Fed. 614, 618 (App. D. C. 1920); see Comment (1035)
35 COL. L. REv. 230, 234.
91. Obrecht-Lynch Corp. v. Clark, 30 F. (2d) 144, 146 (D. Md. 1929). Atd see
Comment (1934) 34 COL L. REV. 1495, 1504, 1505.
92. Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 274 U. S. 588, 592 (1027).
93. Supra, p. 996.
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there are the requirements of comity and of orderly procedure. The
requirements of orderly procedure, it has been noted, triumphed over
the argument of ultra rircs in cases which were alleged to lie outside
the administrative jurisdiction of the subject matter; and it is ventured
that there is no better reason for exempting an attack upon the admin-
istrative jurisdiction on constitutional grounds from the same require-
ments." The inconvenience and hardship to the litigant who is compelled
to proceed with the administrative remedy are assuredly no less when he
believes his case to be without the subject matter than when he assails
the attenmpt to confer jurisdiction of the subject matter. Considerations
of comity are at least equally compelling. 'Mr. Justice Brandeis, insisting
on the exhaustion requirement although the constitutionality of a state
act was in question, said:
"The federal power is paramount. But public interest demands
that, whenever possible, conflict between the two authorities and
irritation be avoided. To this end it is important that the federal
power be not exerted unnecessarily, hastily, or harshly. It is im-
portant also that the demands of comity and courtesy, as well as of
the law, be deferred to." 9
The argument for postponing judicial intervention in constitutional
issues until preliminary resort is had to administrative remedies has added
force when the attack is directed against allegedly unconstitutional acts
of the administrative authorities, For example, a taxing officer may
wrongfully discriminate against a taxpayer in levying assessments. Here
the act of an administrative officer rather than his jurisdiction to act at
all is assailed, and an appellate administrative tribunal can and presum-
ably will correct the complained of wrong."
A limitation upon the application of the exhaustion rule is identified
with Oklahoma Gas Company v. Russell. That case established the rule
that where a tentative rate was allegedly confiscatory and no supersedeas
was allowed pending completion of the legislative process, the exhaustion
requirement was inapplicable.' s Tentative rates established by administra-
tive fiat, it was reasoned, are final legislative acts as to the period during
which they remain in effect pending the final determination; and if the
rates prescribed are confiscatory, the company, deprived of a reasonable
94. "Whether the Act is valid, is not for the moment so impurtant as the fact that
an adequate and orderly method is available for the determination of this question outside
the equity powers of the court." Clark v. Lindemann & Hoversun Co., 83 F. (2d) 59, 69
(C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
95. Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 274 U. S. 583, 595 (1927).
96. Hamerstrom v. Toy National Bank, 81 F. (2d) 628, 636 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
97. 261 U. S. 290 (1922).
98. The doctrine had been earlier formulated in Love v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
185 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911). And see Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.,
262 U. S. 43, 49 (1923); Pacific Telephone Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196 (1924).
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return upon its property during such period, is without remedy unless
their enforcement should be enjoined. The limitation to which the Russell
case gave rise has been extended to other than rate cases."
Another exception to the exhaustion requirement is made where the
very existence of the statute without more is said to affect and injure
the complainant. Under these circumstances a litigant need not wait for
threatened enforcement nor seek relief through administrative channels,
but may at once invoke the assistance of equity. The rule had its inception
in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, which was concerned with a West
Virginia statute requiring pipeline companies to satisfy intrastate needs
before delivering gas to extrastate consumers, thereby interfering with
the established current of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court,
Holmes, Brandeis, and McReynolds, JJ. dissenting, held that the suit
was not premature:
"This is a substantive provision whose terms are both direct and
certain, and to which immediate obedience is commanded. No order
of the commission is required to give it precision or make it obliga-
tory, and it leaves nothing to the discretion of those who are to
enforce it. On the contrary, it prescribes a definite rule of conduct
and in itself puts the rule in force."1'°
The arguments marshalled against this doctrine in the incisive dissent
of Mr. Justice Brandeis seem to the mind of the writer unanswerable.
The mere enactment did not constitute a threat to the flow of gas in
interstate channels, declared Mr. Justice Brandeis, because no officer or
court had power or jurisdiction under the statute to enforce performance
by the gas-producing companies until primary resort was had to the com-
mission and it acted upon the application.
"Until the Commission issues some order which purports to re-
strict in some way the discretion theretofore exercised by a corpora-
tion in respect to exports, every such concern is, under the Act of
1919, legally as free to continue the transportation of gas to Penn-
sylvania and to Ohio as if that statute had not been passed.
"It is possible that the Commission would never be called upon to
act. It is possible that if called upon, the Commission would refuse
99. Porter v. Investor's Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 469 (1932) ; Natural Gas Pipelhtw
Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300 (1938); New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. v. Morse,
42 F. (2d) 49 (D. N. H. 1930). In the Slattery case, the Court demanded a supersedeas
pending exhaustion of administrative remedies in a situation where heavy penalties were
imposed for a failure to disclose information requested by a State Commission, No
mention was made of United States v. Clyde Steamship Co., 36 F. (2d) 691, 693 (C. C. A.
2d, 1929), and Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350, 353 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933),
cases which held that the case of penalties accruing for failure to obey the order of an
administrative body differed in principle from a confiscatory rate or failure to obey a
statutory mandate.
100. 262 U. S. 553, 593, 594 (1923).
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to make an order. It is possible that if the commission made an
order, the order would be of such a character as not to affect seri-
ously the interests which plaintiffs seek to protect. And it is possible
that if any order were made, the state court would suspend its opera-
tion and would eventually annul it. . . . To overcome disobedience,
or disregard, of an order, resort must, under the \Vest Virginia
statutes, be had to the courts . . . the corporation is given oppor-
tunity to defend on the ground that the order is, for any reason,
invalid."
In short, said the Justice, the objection is:
" . . . that the 'judicial stage' of the controversy had not been
reached when these suits were begun; and, Jndeed, has not been since.
See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. . . "101
The rule of the majority in the IfVest Virginia case was reiterated in
Carter v. Carter Coal Company,102 but one may surmise from the record
in Electric Bond & Share Company v. Securities and Exchange Comnnis-
sion .3 that the doctrine is perhaps on the wane. In the latter case the
Electric Bond and Share Company filed a cross-bill asking for relief on
the ground that the provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 applicable to registered holding companies were irreparably
injuring the defendants, even as unregistered holding companies under
no injunctive compulsion to register, by placing a cloud upon their entire
business. Section 4(a) of the Act made it unlawful for public utility
holding companies to perform certain important functions in interstate
commerce or through the mails unless they were registered. Registration,
defendants claimed, would expose them to onerous restrictions which
would constitute a direct invasion of their rights. Since dismissal of
the cross-bill with the suggestion that they register so as to acquire
standing to attack the registration provisions seemed clearly contrary to
City Bank v. Schizader,0 4 and since the Commission must unavoidably
apply the restrictions of the Act to the defendants, the defendants argued
that the court should enjoin the enforcement "of a statute which imme-
diately affects and injures the complainants by its very existence."10
101. Id. at 612-616.
102. 298 U. S. 238, 287 (1936). In the Carter case suit was brought to enjoin the
collection of a 15% tax imposed by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. It
had been urged in the District Court [Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 585
(IV. D. Ky. 1935)] that the suit was premature because the defendant tax collector was
without authority to collect taxes before the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed
them. But the Supreme Court, quoting from Pennsylvania v. rcst Virginia, said that
"The so-called tax of 15% is definitely imposed, and its exaction certain to ensue."
See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 386 (1926).
103. 303 U. S. 419 (1938).
104. 291 U. S. 24, 34 (1934).
105. Petitioner's Brief in the Electric Bond and Share case, pp. 120-121. See generally
id. at 112-123.
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Success had attended a similar argument in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia,' and it would seem that the Supreme Court
might well have found it possible to apply the rule of the West Virginia
and Carter cases which was pressed upon it, had the Court been so in-
clined. Instead, the Court chose to dismiss the cross-bill on the ground
that it presented a,"variety of hypothetical controversies which may never
became real."' 1 7 This may possibly indicate that the rule of Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia has been overruled sub silentio, laying to rest a doctrine
which has on more than one occasion misled the courts in the applica-
tion of the exhaustion rule.' If so, the administrative process is put
beyond the range of a barrage of injunctions such as for a time paralyzed
the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act.'"0
Constitutional questions come before the courts charged with the ten-
sions of political conflict, and onslaughts upon newly created adminis-
trative bodies frequently take on the aspect of political combat. In such
an atmosphere judicial self-restraint becomes an act of statesmans.hip.
The brief interval in which administrative tribunals attempt to sift matters
confided to them may serve to discharge the atmosphere of political
passions. Judicial interposition may become unnecessary for a number
of reasons: the administrative body may decide in favor of the litigant,
or it may decide that it has no jurisdiction. "0 Every consideration which
has impelled the Supreme Court to abstain from "entering unduly into
an area of political conflict""' emphasizes the utility of the exhaustion
rule as a means of avoiding the premature expression of constitutional
views. If it be suggested that the exemption of constitutional questions
from the exhaustion requirement is merely a mode of accelerating the
"test of the validity of a statute that sooner or later will be tested, the
court's whole history of avowals against anticipating adjudication and
the profound conceptions of government on which they are based, give
conclusive answer.""1
2
106. North American Co. v. Landis, 85 F. (2d) 398, 401 (App. D. C. 1936): "That
the rights of the plaintiffs in the present cases would suffer by reason of the stay granted
is apparent, since the very existence of the act, whether they register tinder it or not,
must of necessity affect materially the conduct of their business during the pendeney of
these suits."
107. 303 U. S. 419, 443 (1938).
108. See Yarnell v. Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F. (2d) 435, 438 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934) ; El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott, 15 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W. D. Tex. 1936) ; McDermott
v. Bradford, 10 F. Supp. 661, 665 (IV. D. Wash. 1935).
109. See Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, x935 and 1936 (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 577, 616, n. 69.
110. See Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186 (1900).
111. Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 109, at 623.
112. Id. at 629.
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III.
A number of commentators, concluding that jurisdictional issues are
reserved to courts, and regarding such issues as questions of law, deduce
therefrom that the exhaustion requirement is confined to questions of
fact."' The Mllyers case establishes that questions of jurisdiction fall
within the exhaustion doctrine, and in so far as such issues are remitted
to administrative tribunals for preliminary determination, the exhaustion
rule may be said to extend to questions of law.114 The distinction between
questions of law and fact as a test for the need of preliminary adminis-
trative resort is, however, employed in the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission cases. Preliminary resort was dispensed with in Great Northern
Railway Company v. Merchants Ele-vator Company because the problem
of what construction "shall be given to a railroad tariff presents ordinarily
a question of law . . ""' To the extent that the Interstate Commerce
Commission Act purported to conserve common law remedies, it may be
said that the courts retained concurrent jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the ex-
clusive preliminary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
was a creature of judicial fashioning in the interests of uniformity, the
Supreme Court might set bounds to its self-limitation, retaining concur-
rent jurisdiction for the lower courts of questions of law. These cases,
it is to be borne in mind, do not detract from the argument that equity
jurisdiction is absent in the presence of an administrative remedy, because
the mere fact that an issue of law is presented does not of itself suffice
to confer jurisdiction in equity. Except for two earlier immigration
cases, the employment of the "law" criterion has apparently been con-
fined to the Interstate Commerce Commission cases; and the result in
the latter cases at times leaves something to be desired. 1
The early immigration cases stand on a somewhat different footing.
In United States v. Sing Tuck" 7 a Chinese who claimed citizenship urged
113. See Comments (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 1251, 1265, (1935) 35 Cot. L RE-.
230, 234; Alpert, supra note 3, at 395.
114. The Myers case has been rationalized as an exception to the "rule" that questions
of law are reserved to the courts, on the ground that there the question of jurisdiction
involved an intricate question of fact. Comment (1938) 51 H,-tv. L. REV. 1251, 1265. The
distinction between law and fact is tenuous at best, and has been trenchantly criticized.
DicKinso., op. cit. supra note 60, at 55. To graft an exception upon that dubious dis-
tinction would entail an inquiry into the extent of the mixture of law and fact necessary
to forestall exhaustion--confusion thrice confounded. For a case insisting on exhaustion
where the question of jurisdiction was a pure question of law, see South Porto Rico
Sugar Co. v. Munoz, 28 F. (2d) 820, 822 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
115. 259 U. S. 285, 291 (1922).
116. In Great Northern Ry. v. Ry-Krisp Co., 4 F. Supp. 358. 365 (D. Minn. 1933),
the court found that the question of whether Ry-Krisp is to be classed as a cooked cereal
food or as bakery goods is one of fact which requires preliminary administrative resort.
Whether young onions are "onions green" or "plant, strawberry, and vegetable" was
deemed a question of law in American Ry. Express v. Price Bros., 54 F. (2d) 67
(C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
117. 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
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that he was without the ambit of a statute providing for administrative
appeal in the case of an alien excluded from admission, and that in con-
sequence, under Gonzales v. Williams, 8 preliminary resort to the admin-
istrative procedure was unnecessary. Distinguishing the Gonzales case,
Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"In Gonzales v. Williams . . . there was no use in delaying the
issue of the writ until an appeal had been taken, because in that case
there was no dispute about the facts but merely a question of law
[is a Porto Rican an alien]. Here the issue, if there is one, is a pure
matter of fact, a claim of citizenship."' 119
The necessity for resorting to the administrative appeal was rested by
Mr. Justice Holmes on the requirements of orderly procedure. But the
statute did not purport to differentiate between questions of law and
fact for purposes of administrative appeal, nor does the decision attempt
to explain the impotency of the orderly procedure requirement with
respect to questions of law. Possibly the distinction taken owes its in-
ception to the necessity for escaping from the sweep of the broad state-
ment in the Gonzales case that exhaustion is unnecessary in the absence
of jurisdiction. Today, analysis in terms of primary exclusive jurisdic-
tion might impel a court to decide that the administrative body had been
given preliminary jurisdiction of both questions of law and fact. For it
seems clear that both questions may be entrusted to administrative bodies
for exclusive preliminary determination. An administrative remedy may
be made exclusive if adequate judicial review is provided. 120
Since Congress can and does confide the preliminary determination of
questions of law to administrative agencies, it would seem that the appli-
cation of the exhaustion doctrine, so closely allied to the rule of exclusive
preliminary jurisdiction, should not be tested by the illusory distinction
between questions of law and fact. The most pointed criticism of the
exhaustion requirement in cases which primarily involve questions of law
is that administrative bodies are untrained to handle them and the require-
ment is in this situation time-consuming and futile.'21 But administrative
agencies are, in fact, constantly grappling with questions of law, for they
can scarcely proceed without interpreting the statutes which they are called
upon to administer. And in the process of unceasing application and
118. 192 U. S. 1, 15 (1904). Gonzales, a native of Porto Rico, claimed to be wrong-
fully excluded by the commissioner of immigration. The Supreme Court found that she
was not an alien and did not come within the act, and that consequently "the commissiioner
had no jurisdiction to detain and deport her by deciding the mere question of law to tile
contrary; and she was not obliged to resort to the Superintendent or the Secretary." See
also Ex parte Koerner, 176 Fed. 478 (C. C. E. D. Wash. 1909).
119. 194 U. S. 161, 168 (1904).
120. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 343-346 (1937) ; Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 48 (1938).
121. Stason, supra note 89, at 667.
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interpretation of these statutes they become steeped in the legal problems
which cluster about the particular agencies.1 -2 As against the possible
waste of time attributable to inadequate administrative bodies, there must
be balanced the waste inherent in litigating in an area that is not suscepti-
ble of sharp definition. Findings of ultimate fact subsume questions of
law, and questions of law are rooted in and cannot be divorced from a
strict appraisal of facts. To employ the tenuous law and fact distinctionil
as the criterion for the application of the exhaustion requirement is
inevitably to foster litigation. The need for orderly procedure, the re-
quirements of comity, are no less urgent as to questions of law than
questions of fact. It is in both cases desirable to have a simple, readily
understandable rule of administration whicl will obviate the necessity
for a judicial determination in each instance as to whether exhaustion
is necessary.
IV.
But what of the expense to the litigant? Is he to be subjected to the
burdens of costly administrative hearings only to learn that the admin-
istrative body is without jurisdiction? And why increase those burdens
by the delay and expense which attend administrative rehearings? 'Most
rehearings will involve no more than emphasis by a litigant upon some
error of factual or legal interpretation which an administrative body may
have overlooked, and which it should have the opportunity to correct.
\Vhere the presentation of new evidence is relied upon, the considerations
which favor an administrative hearing in the first instance are equally
compelling with respect to the rehearing. "" Nor can the burden imposed
upon the courts by litigation with respect to whether an application for an
administrative rehearing is necessary be ignored, particularly when ad-
ministrative bodies may in most cases deny such applications pro forma,
thus foreclosing both expense to the litigant and burdensome litigation.
It may be assumed that the frequently recurring attacks on admin-
istrative jurisdiction of the subject matter will as often as not prove to
be without foundation, with the result that the courts may find them-
122. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Associated Gas & Electric Co.,
98 F. (2d) 795, 798 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). See also Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933) ; Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F. (2d) 1044, 1047 (C. C. A.
10th, 1931).
123. DicKxcsox, op. tit. sumra note 60, at 55: 2 SHAM,&N.N. op. dt. supra note 72. at
439.
124. Statutory recognition of these factors is found in §9(a) of the SEctnTrIES A-r
oF 1933 [15 U. S. C. §77i (a) (1934)] which provides: "If either party shall apply to
the court for leave to adduce additional evidence . . . the court may order such additional
evidence to be taken before the Commission . . . The Commission may modify its
findings as to the facts, by reason of the additional evidence so taken . . . " See alsot
SEcURITIEs EXCHANGE AcT oF 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78y(a) (1934) ; Punrmc UTILiTy HoLD-
ING Comp.xY Act oF 1935, 15 U. S. C. § 79x(a) (Supp. 1937).
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selves burdened with procedural questions, half of which might be diverted
at the outset. It cannot be desirable to place the administrative process
at the mercy of every fanciful jurisdictional attack. The expense to the
litigant must yield, the courts have said, to the necessity of preserving
orderly procedure, the need for preserving the efficacy of the adminis-
trative process. 125 While it may be urged that constitutional attacks upon
the basic jurisdiction of the agency may forever be put at rest in but
one appeal to the courts, such issues are not always resolved in favor
of the litigant; and in the interim the intention of Congress or of a State
may for a considerable period be nullified. The administration of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was perforce held in abey-
ance for about two and one-half years while the validity of the statute
was being determined. 12  In such a situation the cost to the litigant of
preliminary resort to the administrative body is far outweighed by the
advantages that inhere in an effort to give some effect to the intent of
Congress.
Judicial relief is today conditioned upon exhaustion of the adminis-
trative remedy largely because courts of equity believed that the presence
of that remedy, like the availability of an adequate remedy at law, de-
feated equity jurisdiction. Further impetus was given to the development
of the doctrine by the requirements of orderly procedure, by the necessity
that "even fundamental questions should be determined in an orderly
way."' 127 To this requirement the counsels of comity gave added weight.
Meanwhile, experience with the administrative process has gradually per-
suaded the courts that something is to be gained by enlisting the assistance
of specialized tribunals for a preliminary sifting of the complicated tech-
nical problems that are a concomitant of an industrialized society. By
insisting upon this preliminary process courts preserve themselves from
an avalanche of litigation that might threaten to engulf them.128 The
logic of the development of the rule demands a crystallization of its
non-discretionary nature in all branches of the doctrine. The retention
of discretion in the application of the rule constitutes a continuing invita-
tion to litigation. It is this factor, more than any other, which has resulted
in an incrustation of case-law about an essentially simple rule. Were the
exhaustion requirement rigorously applied in each instance, much of
this wasteful litigation would soon be cut off at the source.
125. Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 304 U. S. 209, 222 (1933);
Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 86 F. (2d) 862, 864 (App. D. C. 1936); Bradley Lumber Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2d) 97, 100 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
126. "Within a few months after the passage of the Act on August 26, 1935, a total
of 58 suits were brought challenging the Act as unconstitutional . . ." FoUnTH ANNrAL
RPORT OF SECURITIES & EXCHANGE CoMIssION (1938) 47.
127. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 168 (1904).
128. For example, there were 8,213 complaint cases alone on the dockets of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board in the period from July 1, 1937, to June 10, 1938.
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